SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CULLEY et al. v. MARSHALL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALABAMA, et al.
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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No. 22-585.
Argued October 30, 2023
Decided May 9, 2024
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Petitioner Halima Culley loaned her car to her son, who was later pulled over by Alabama police officers and arrested for possession of marijuana. Petitioner Lena Sutton loaned her car to a friend, who was stopped by Alabama police and arrested for trafficking methamphetamine. In both cases, petitioners' cars were seized under an Alabama civil forfeiture law that permitted seizure of a car "incident to an arrest" so long as the State then "promptly" initiated a forfeiture case. Ala. Code §20-2-93(b)(1), (c). The State of Alabama filed forfeiture complaints against Culley's and Sutton's cars just 10 and 13 days, respectively, after their seizure. While their forfeiture proceedings were pending, Culley and Sutton each filed purported class-action complaints in federal court seeking money damages under 42 U. S. C. §1983, claiming that state officials violated their due process rights by retaining their cars during the forfeiture process without holding preliminary hearings. In a consolidated appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' claims, holding that a timely forfeiture hearing affords claimants due process and that no separate preliminary hearing is constitutionally required.
Held: In civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the Due Process Clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate preliminary hearing.
(a) Due process ordinarily requires States to provide notice and a hearing before seizing real property. But States may immediately seize personal property subject to civil forfeiture when the property (for example, a car) otherwise could be removed, destroyed, or concealed before a forfeiture hearing. When a State seizes personal property, due process requires a timely post-seizure forfeiture hearing. See United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U. S. 242, 249-250; United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555, 562-565.
The Court's decisions in $8,850 and Von Neumann make crystal clear that due process does not require a separate preliminary hearing to determine whether seized personal property may be retained pending the ultimate forfeiture hearing. In $8,850, the Court addressed the process due when the Customs Service seized currency from an individual entering the United States but did not immediately file for civil forfeiture of the currency. The Court concluded that a post-seizure delay "may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time," 461 U. S., at 562-563, and prescribed factors for courts to consider in assessing whether a forfeiture hearing is timely. Id., at 564-565. In Von Neumann, a property owner failed to declare the purchase of his new car upon driving it into the United States, and a customs official seized the car after determining that it was subject to civil forfeiture. The plaintiff filed a petition for remission of the forfeiture-in essence, a request under federal law that the Government exercise its discretion to forgive the forfeiture-which the Government did not answer for 36 days. The plaintiff sued, arguing that the Government's delay in answering the remission petition violated due process. The Court rejected that claim, broadly holding that due process did not require a pre-forfeiture-hearing remission procedure in the first place. See 474 U. S., at 249-250. Instead, Von Neumann held that a timely forfeiture hearing satisfies due process in civil forfeiture cases, and that $8,850 specifies the standard for when a forfeiture hearing is timely.
Petitioners' argument for a separate preliminary hearing appears to be a backdoor argument for a more timely forfeiture hearing to allow a property owner with a good defense to recover her property quickly. But the Court's precedents already require a timely hearing, and a property owner can raise $8,850-based arguments to ensure a timely hearing. Petitioners' efforts to distinguish Von Neumann on the ground that the statutory remission procedure in that case was discretionary fail because that fact played no role in the Court's constitutional analysis. Petitioners also cannot distinguish the relevant language in Von Neumann as dicta, as the Court ruled for the Government on the ground that a timely "forfeiture proceeding, without more, provides the postseizure hearing required by due process" in civil forfeiture cases. 474 U. S., at 249. Similarly, petitioners' contention that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, should govern petitioners' request for a preliminary hearing fails given that this Court decided $8,850 and Von Neumann after Mathews.
In addition, petitioners point to the Court's Fourth Amendment decisions in the criminal context to support their contention that a preliminary hearing is required in the civil forfeiture context. That analogy fails. Fourth Amendment hearings are not adversarial, and address only whether probable cause supports the arrestee's detention. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119-122. Here, petitioners argue that the immediate seizure of personal property requires adversarial preliminary hearings, and they assert that those hearings must address their affirmative defense of innocent ownership. But the Due Process Clause does not require more extensive preliminary procedures for the temporary retention of property than for the temporary restraint of persons.
(b) Historical practice reinforces the Court's conclusions in $8,850 and Von Neumann that due process does not require preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. Since the Founding era, many federal and state statutes have authorized the Government to seize personal property and hold it pending a forfeiture hearing, without a separate preliminary hearing. Petitioners and their amici do not identify any federal or state statutes that, before the late 20th century, required preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. Some States have recently enacted laws requiring preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases, but those recent laws do not support a constitutional mandate for preliminary hearings in every State. History demonstrates that both Congress and the States have long authorized law enforcement to seize personal property and hold it until a forfeiture hearing. The absence of separate preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture proceedings-from the Founding until the late 20th century-is weighty evidence that due process does not require such hearings.
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